Cisco SD-WAN KeyDrift: hunt UAT-11473 after CVE-2026-20127

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HUNT · Actively exploited (KEV). Last updated 29 October 2026. See the Alert Tracker

If you run Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controllers, Managers or Validators, read this with the Talos KeyDrift analysis open. Patching CVE-2026-20127 is necessary and not sufficient: if the controller was reachable while vulnerable, rotate IPsec and control-plane keying material.

What it is

Diagram of KeyDrift modules PolyFlame and LittleFilch on an SD-WAN controller staging to /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin
KeyDrift modules on a Catalyst SD-WAN controller. Source paths: Cisco Talos, 28 October 2026.

CVE-2026-20127 (opens in a new tab) is a CVSS 10.0 Critical authentication bypass in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN. CISA added it to KEV on 25 February 2026 (federal due date 27 February). On 28 October 2026, Cisco Talos published that cluster UAT-11473 used the flaw to deploy KeyDrift — two modules that steal IPsec keying material from the vdaemon process:

  • PolyFlame (libdssl.so) — injected into vdaemon; TinyShell-style remote access and relay.
  • LittleFilch (libcommon.so) — hooks SSL_read, stages RSA-encrypted key records to /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin (and a short-lived /var/tmp/vdaemon.conf).

FIRST EPSS (28 October): about 0.893 (99.8th percentile). Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-11473 infrastructure overlaps Volt Typhoon’s Silent Train covert access network — see our explainer Volt Typhoon Silent Train relay framework.

Who is affected

Table of first fixed Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN software releases for CVE-2026-20127
First fixed releases by train. Source: Cisco advisory cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk (updated 28 October 2026).

Vulnerable product family: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator software before the first fixed releases below. First fixed per Cisco: 20.9.8.2, 20.12.5.3 or 20.12.6.1, 20.15.4.2, 20.18.2.1. EoSM trains (20.11, 20.14, 20.16) should migrate to a fixed release. Controllers that exposed management SSH/NETCONF (ports 22 / 830) to untrusted networks while on a vulnerable build are the priority for both patching and key rotation.

Controller hunt

Four panels of KeyDrift hunt artefacts: runit launchers, injector chain, LittleFilch staging paths, and auth log IOC
Controller hunt artefacts from Talos and the Cisco advisory IoCs. Authorised estates only.

On authorised controllers, look for persistence and staging that Talos documented:

  1. Modified runit service paths — unexpected content or remounts tied to /etc/sv/sshd/run and /etc/sv/aaamgr/run, including remounting /rootfs.rw executable.
  2. /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin (and deleted /var/tmp/vdaemon.conf) — LittleFilch staging of stolen key material.
  3. Injected vdaemon and conf_sshd — conf_sshd left running; rsshd / libdssl.so injection into vdaemon PIDs; transient /tmp/system-vdaemon.
  4. Auth log anomaly — Accepted publickey for vmanage-admin from an unexpected System IP (defang any IoC IPs from Talos before you paste them into tickets).
# Illustrative host checks (authorised maintenance window)
ls -la /etc/sv/sshd/run /etc/sv/aaamgr/run
ls -la /var/tmp/vdaemon.bin /var/tmp/vdaemon.conf 2>/dev/null
ps aux | egrep 'conf_sshd|rsshd|vdaemon'
grep -E 'Accepted publickey for vmanage-admin' /var/log/auth.log

Sigma rules, KQL and Splunk starting points for controller syslog / file telemetry are in Hunt Lab pack 2026-10-29-cisco-sdwan-keydrift (PR linked from PUBLISH.md once open).

Silent Train overlap

Callout that Talos links UAT-11473 infrastructure to Volt Typhoon Silent Train with a link to the Cyber-Threat.net explainer
Attribution overlap is Talos’s assessment. Read our Silent Train explainer for the relay framework.

Treat the Silent Train overlap as context for prioritisation, not as a claim that every KeyDrift hit is Volt Typhoon. If you already hunted Silent Train after our earlier piece, revisit controller estates that were internet-reachable before the February KEV window closed.

What to do

Four-step remediation: patch, hunt, rotate keys, harden management access
Patch is step one. Key rotation is mandatory if compromise is plausible — LittleFilch targets data-plane keys.
  1. Patch Controller, Manager and Validator to a first fixed release (or later).
  2. Hunt the artefacts above; collect admin-tech and open a Cisco TAC case if anything matches.
  3. Rotate keys if the controller was exposed while vulnerable or if hunt findings are positive — rebuild IPsec / control-plane trust; do not stop at the software upgrade.
  4. Harden management-plane access (restrict ports 22 and 830 to known controller IPs) and follow Cisco’s Catalyst SD-WAN hardening guidance.

Sources

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